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WHEN DOES BIG LAW WORK?
ABRAHAM J.B. CABLE*
Law firms have grown from hundreds of lawyers to thousands of lawyers,
and the conventional wisdom is that this trend fuels dissatisfaction among
lawyers. This Article scrutinizes that conventional wisdom based on interviews
with lawyers who joined large firms through law-firm mergers. These lawyers
offer a valuable perspective on firm size because they made abrupt changes
from small to large firms. Though some interviewees echoed the conventional
wisdom, others suggested that larger firm size has limited or even positive
effects on professional satisfaction. In one counter-narrative, large law firms
are relatively diffuse organizations that have limited influence over individual
lawyers. In another counter-narrative, large law firms helpfully insulate
lawyers from the business risks of smaller firms. I offer a framework to explain
these varied experiences. The framework highlights the importance of:
seniority, practice-area compatibility, local office attributes, and the manner
and rate of firm growth. These new perspectives can inform future research
and improve advice to law students and lawyers.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Every year, thousands of lawyers find their practices transplanted to new
firms through law-firm mergers.1 In many cases, the change in practice
environment is abrupt and dramatic—a lawyer formerly practicing with fewer
than ten other lawyers must navigate a national or international firm of
thousands of lawyers.2 Some lawyers chose this change in venue as leaders of
the acquired firm, but other lawyers had the decision made for them.3 In either
event, these lawyers practiced in a small firm one day and in a large firm the
next, with career goals, practice area, client base, and professional background
held constant.
These mergers are part of a broader trend in the legal profession. Large
national law firms (sometimes referred to as “big law”) are getting considerably
bigger. When today’s senior partners graduated from law school, a large firm
might have consisted of 100 lawyers operating primarily in a local market.4
Today, nearly a quarter of Am Law 100 firms have over 1,000 lawyers, with

* Professor of Law, University of California Hastings College of the Law. I received valuable
comments on early drafts from Ben Depoorter, Dave Owen, Morris Ratner, Joan C. Williams, and
participants in the UC Hastings 10-10 Faculty Workshops.
1. See ALTMAN WEIL MERGERLINE, 2017 MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS (2017) (reporting 102
acquisitions with an average firm size of 27 lawyers in 2017).
2. E.g., infra Section III.A (providing an example of a merger between a 35-lawyer firm and a
1,000-lawyer firm).
3. E.g., infra note 175 (citing examples of associates who chose small firms intentionally and
then learned their firms would merge with larger firms).
4. See David L. Chambers, Satisfaction in the Practice of Law: Findings from a Long-Term Study
of Attorneys’ Careers 1 (Univ. of Mich., Pub. Law Research Paper No. 330, 2013). Chambers writes:
[In the late 1960s,] the overwhelming majority of Michigan graduates and lawschool graduates in general began their careers in solo practice or in very small
law firms. Few firms with more than one hundred lawyers even existed. [Forty
years later], more than half of Michigan students started their careers in firms of
more than two hundred, and many started in firms of over a thousand.
Id.
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six firms reporting over 2,000 lawyers.5
Researchers consider this
consolidation a “transformative change” in the legal profession.6
The conventional wisdom within the legal academy is that the change is for
the worse. The large-firm environment has been associated with both
professional dissatisfaction and an erosion of important professional values,
and the prevailing advice to lawyers and law students is that they ought to avoid
or seek to change big law to the extent possible.7 A heavily cited article
appearing in the Vanderbilt Law Review puts it plainly by advising graduating
law students to: “Seek alternatives to private practice—and especially to big
firm practice.”8
But, what if law firm scale does not matter much to individual lawyers?
What if the legal profession is, at bottom, a profession of individual lawyers
and not firms (reminiscent of the old adage that clients “hire lawyers not
firms”9)? Perhaps more provocatively, what if large firms actually mitigate
pressures of modern law practice? In a world of intense competition and
empowered clients, smaller firms might face severe business risks and
fundamental questions of viability.
In this Article, I probe the conventional wisdom by collecting testimonies
from lawyers who joined large firms through law-firm mergers. What I found
was that acquired lawyers had experiences that were far more varied than the
conventional wisdom would suggest. While some lawyers essentially
confirmed the existing literature’s apprehension about big law—reporting
intense focus on profitability, a loss of professional autonomy, and a difficult
environment for professional development10—at least two counter-narratives
emerged. In one counter-narrative, firm size did not profoundly affect lawyers.
Law firms appeared as diffuse organizations, and individual lawyers or offices
remained the crucial power centers of the firm.11 In another counter-narrative,
firm setting did matter, but the move to a larger firm alleviated professional
5. See The Am Law 100 at a Glance, AM. LAW., May 2017, at 58, 58–64.
6. See Terry K. Adams & David L. Chambers, Starting Out: Changing Patterns of First Jobs for
Michigan Law School Graduates, L. QUADRANGLE, Fall 2009, at 23, 25–26.
7. See infra Section II (reviewing the existing literature on law firm size).
8. Patrick J. Schiltz, On Being a Happy, Healthy, and Ethical Member of an Unhappy,
Unhealthy, and Unethical Profession, 52 VAND. L. REV. 871, 938 (1999).
9. Mark Herrmann, Inside Straight: Hiring Law Firms or Lawyers?, ABOVE THE LAW (Apr. 21,
2011, 11:18 AM), http://abovethelaw.com/2011/04/inside-straight-hiring-law-firms-or-lawyers/
[https://perma.cc/GH45-HXHY] (“At every conference, and in many articles, people pose the question:
‘As a client, do you hire law firms, or do you hire lawyers?’ The clients dutifully respond that they
hire lawyers, not firms.”).
10. See infra Sections III.B.1 and III.C.1.
11. See infra Section III.B.2.
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anxieties. Large law firms helped lawyers pool business risk and relieved
lawyers of burdensome administrative obligations.12
I offer four hypotheses to explain these disparate experiences. First,
interviewees suggested that seniority matters. The challenges of large-firm
settings—including a heavy reliance on economic metrics of performance—
affect young lawyers more than they affect established lawyers.13 Second, the
economics of individual practice areas greatly influence compatibility with
large firms. Some practice areas benefit substantially from national-firm
resources, while other practice areas are more localized and clash with firm
economics.14 Third, interviewees suggested that attributes of the local office
matter. With some firms failing to bridge geographic divides between offices,
the size, culture, and influence of local offices help define lawyers’
experiences.15 Fourth, extraordinary firm growth—through mergers or lateral
hiring—places stress on firms that may adversely affect lawyers’ professional
experiences.16
This Article is an exploratory study. It is an effort to generate “grounded
theory” that can improve on a conventional wisdom prone to simplistic
interpretations of existing evidence.17 The hypotheses I offer will require
confirmation in future research, so I offer suggestions to guide those efforts.18
In the meantime, law students and lawyers must make career decisions based
on the best information currently available, so I also offer suggestions for
putting this Article’s observations to practical use.19
This Article proceeds in three sections. In Section II, I provide an overview
of existing literature relating to law-firm size, and I identify gaps in existing
theory. In Section III, I describe my methodology, my primary observation
(including some support for the conventional wisdom but also two prominent
counter-narratives), and my hypotheses for explaining the varied outcomes. In
Section IV, I consider how the interviews might guide future research and
improve career counseling.
12. See infra Section III.B.3.
13. See infra Section III.C.1 (asserting that junior lawyers are especially affected by negative
aspects of the large-firm environment).
14. See infra Section III.C.2 (identifying practice areas that are less compatible with large firms).
15. See infra Section III.C.3 (discussing the difficulties of managing lawyers remotely).
16. See infra Section III.C.4 (discussing integration problems at rapidly expanding firms).
17. See infra text accompanying notes 99–103 (distinguishing exploratory research methods
from confirmatory research methods).
18. See infra Section IV.A (providing recommendations for future survey and qualitative
research).
19. See infra Section IV.B (making recommendations for career counseling).
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II. EXISTING LITERATURE
At least three distinct literatures grapple with the effects of firm size on
lawyers: (1) economic analyses of law-firm growth, (2) survey research
measuring professional satisfaction across practice settings, and (3) historical
critiques of the law-firm environment. These three literatures have been
synthesized into a conventional wisdom that takes a dim view of large law
firms. In this section, I briefly summarize key works20 and identify theoretical
gaps that this Article seeks to fill.
A. The Tournament Model
Legal scholarship includes a prominent economic model of law firm size.
Specifically, Mark Galanter and Thomas Palay observe the steady growth of a
“tournament” model of law firm organization in Tournament of Lawyers: The
Transformation of the Big Law Firm published in 1991.21 Honed largely by
New York law firms in the 1960s and 70s,22 this model is characterized by
aggressive hiring of highly credentialed associates,23 high starting salaries,24 a
high proportion of associates to partners,25 and a difficult but credible path to
partnership.26
20. I have chosen the “key works” based largely on the extent to which they focus on the factors
relevant to this Article: firm size and satisfaction. By choosing to discuss these works, I do not mean
to deny the importance of other contributions to the literature analyzing law firms. For insightful
sociological perspectives (that influenced the authors I discuss below), see generally ROBERT L.
NELSON, PARTNERS WITH POWER, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE LARGE LAW FIRM (1988)
and JOHN P. HEINZ & EDWARD O. LAUMANN, CHICAGO LAWYERS: THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF THE
BAR (1982). For an influential economic analysis of large firms, see generally Ronald J. Gilson &
Robert H. Mnookin, Sharing Among the Human Capitalists: An Economic Inquiry into the Corporate
Law Firm and How Partners Split Profits, 37 STAN. L. REV. 313 (1985). For analysis of how the lawfirm environment affects women and minorities in particular, see generally JOAN C. WILLIAMS &
VETA T. RICHARDSON, NEW MILLENNIUM, SAME GLASS CEILING? THE IMPACT OF LAW FIRM
COMPENSATION
SYSTEMS
ON
WOMEN
10
(2010),
at
https://worklifelaw.org/publications/SameGlassCeiling.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8UG6-RS8U]
(considering how various compensation systems affect female partners) and David B. Wilkins,
Partners Without Power? A Preliminary Look at Black Partners in Corporate Law Firms, 2 J. INST.
FOR STUDY LEGAL ETHICS 15 (1999).
21. See MARC GALANTER & THOMAS PALAY, TOURNAMENT OF LAWYERS: THE
TRANSFORMATION OF THE BIG LAW FIRM 3 (1991).
22. Though the tournament model has its roots in earlier periods, Galanter and Palay suggest that
its features became most recognizable when, in 1968, the firm of Cravath, Swaine, and Moore broke
an implicit agreement among firms to pay associates a “going rate.” See id. at 55–57.
23. See id. (describing hiring practices).
24. See id. (describing starting salaries).
25. See id. at 59–62 (describing the concept of “leverage”).
26. See id. at 62–66 (describing promotion and partnership at large firms).

CABLE, MULR VOL. 102, NO. 3 (DO NOT DELETE)

880

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

4/22/2019 9:40 AM

[102:875

According to Galanter and Palay, the logic of the tournament model
compels growth.27 By their account, law-firm organization is best explained as
an attempt to maximize the human capital of individual equity partners.28 To
achieve this goal, a partner’s human capital must be paired with multiple
associates.29 Attracting sufficient numbers of associates requires minting
sufficient numbers of new partners each year so that associates will stay in the
“tournament.”30 Completing the pyramid scheme, each of these newly minted
partners must then be paired with multiple new associates.31
In a 2008 refresh of the original thesis, Galanter teams with William
Henderson to update the model to account for changes in law firm organization
over recent decades. 32 The update is in part a victory lap in confirming that the
predicted growth of partnerships occurred.33 It is also a refinement of the
tournament model. Acknowledging that increasing numbers of lawyers occupy
non-equity (but senior) positions in firms, Galanter and Henderson nonetheless
maintain that the “equity core” of the original tournament model persists.34
The thrust of the tournament model is descriptive rather than normative. Its
primary contribution has been predicting big law’s growth trajectory and
providing a common vocabulary for describing law firm organization.35
But Galanter and Palay do take a moment to express concern about the
effects of law-firm growth on the profession. In the introduction to Tournament
of Lawyers they warn:
Growth changes the nature of the firm. Informality recedes;
collegiality gives way; notions of public service and
independence are marginalized; the imperative of growth
collides with notions of dignified passivity in obtaining
business. Eventually, the firm faces the necessity of either
reorganizing to support ever-larger increments of growth or
27. See id. at 77–120 (attempting to explain and model the growth of large firms).
28. See id. at 88–93 (asserting that law firms are organized principally to share human capital).
29. See id. at 92–93 (discussing how lawyers share “surplus” human capital).
30. See id. at 106 (“The integrity of the firm’s compensation package depends upon the
associate’s ability to observe the promotion percentage.”).
31. See id. at 107.
32. See generally Marc Galanter & William Henderson, The Elastic Tournament: A Second
Transformation of the Big Law Firm, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1867 (2008) (describing the original
tournament model and recent changes).
33. See id. at 1867 (“[O]ur findings corroborate some of the core theoretical insights of
Tournament of Lawyers.”).
34. See id. at 1882–1906 (describing an updated “elastic tournament model”).
35. See id. at 1871 n.14 (citing a “lively and provocative literature” based on the tournament
model).
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reorganizing to suppress growth. Either way, collegiality,
independence, and public service are likely to be jeopardized.36
Similarly, Galanter and Henderson’s 2008 offering is mostly a descriptive
update, but also expresses concern about the effects of continued law-firm
growth on minority lawyers, female lawyers, and millennials.37
B. Survey Research
Law schools, bar groups, and other researchers have surveyed lawyers
regarding the effects of practice setting on job satisfaction. A 2011 article by
Jerome Organ reviews more than forty such studies of varying quality.38
According to Organ, these studies show in the aggregate that “[lawyers] in
the public sector and in public interest work generally [report] greater
satisfaction than those in private practice, particularly those in larger firms.”39
Organ cited four studies published in 2000 or later in support of the
proposition.40 Two of the studies showed lower levels of satisfaction for
lawyers in private practice than for lawyers in other practice settings, but
without further differentiating between large and small firms.41 The third was

36. GALANTER & PALAY, supra note 21, at 3.
37. See Galanter & Henderson, supra note 32, at 1906–28.
38. See generally Jerome M. Organ, What Do We Know About the Satisfaction/Dissatisfaction
of Lawyers? A Meta-Analysis of Research on Lawyer Satisfaction and Well-Being, 8 U. ST. THOMAS
L.J. 225 (2011) (analyzing lawyer satisfaction surveys conducted from 1984–2010).
39. See id. at 273 (emphasis added).
40. See id. at 265 nn.204–05. In the interest of brevity, I have not summarized pre-2000 surveys
discussed by Organ.
41. First, Organ cited a study of University of Michigan Law School graduates published in
2000. See id. at 265 n.204. The study focused primarily on minority graduates but also included
information on non-minority graduates. See Richard O. Lempert et al., Michigan’s Minority Graduates
in Practice: The River Runs Through Law School, 25 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 395, 444–45 (2000). In
general, those in private practice were less likely to report that they were satisfied with their jobs than
attorneys in “government” or “business.” See id. For example, among 1990s graduates, 63.2% of
minority lawyers and 71.7% of white lawyers in private practice reported being satisfied with their
jobs, while 85.4% of minority lawyers and 87% of white lawyers in government jobs reported being
satisfied with their jobs. See id. Second, Organ cited a study that focused largely on the relationship
between personality type and job satisfaction but also collected data on legal specialization and firm
size. See Organ, supra note 38, at 265 n.204. Across all job settings (military, legal aid, public
defender, legal department, government, private practice, judicial clerkship, and missing cases),
respondents reported satisfaction levels ranging from 22 to 18.73. See Lawrence R. Richard,
Psychological Type and Job Satisfaction Among Practicing Lawyers in the United States, 29 CAP. U.
L. REV. 979, 1058 (2002). Lawyers in private practice reported an average score of 18.74, towards the
bottom across all job settings. See id.
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a study of Yale Law School graduates published in 2008.42 On a seven-point
scale, lawyers working in small or medium size firms reported an average
satisfaction score of 4.47 and lawyers in large firms reported an average
satisfaction score of 4.05.43 In contrast, respondents working in the categories
of judiciary, academic, government, and public interest reported average
satisfaction scores of 5.79 or higher.44 Fourth, Organ cited the After the JD
project, a nationwide longitudinal study of lawyers who entered the profession
in 2000.45 That study asked respondents about both an overall measure of
satisfaction and specific “dimensions” of satisfaction.46 Reports from that study
published in 2004 and 2008 showed that large firm lawyers were the least
satisfied among respondents on a dimension of satisfaction referred to as “job
setting.”47
While these results sound indicting of large law firms, there is some
ambiguity in these findings. In the After the JD study, lawyers practicing in
large firms may have averaged lower scores on the job-setting dimension, but
those lawyers averaged higher scores than small-firm lawyers on other
dimensions.48 Importantly, respondents in large firms reported higher levels of
overall satisfaction than small-firm lawyers (i.e., they were more likely than
lawyers in smaller firms to report being extremely or moderately satisfied with
their decisions to become lawyers).49

42. See generally Deborah J. Cantrell et al., Walking the Path of the Law: How Law Graduates
Navigate Career Choices and Tolerate Jobs that Fail to Meet Expectations, 14 CARDOZO J.L. &
GENDER 267 (2008).
43. See id. at 298.
44. See id.
45. See Organ, supra note 38, at 249 n.123.
46. See RONIT DINOVITZER ET AL., NALP FOUND. FOR LAW CAREER RESEARCH & EDUC. &
AM. BAR FOUND., AFTER THE JD: FIRST RESULTS OF A NATIONAL STUDY OF LEGAL CAREERS 50
(2004) [hereinafter AFTER THE JD I].
47. See id.; RONIT DINOVITZER ET AL., NALP FOUND. FOR LAW CAREER RESEARCH & EDUC.
& AM. BAR FOUND., AFTER THE JD II: SECOND RESULTS FROM A NATIONAL STUDY OF LEGAL
CAREERS 50 (2009) [hereinafter AFTER THE JD II].
48. In After the JD I, large-firm lawyers reported higher levels of satisfaction on the “power
track” and “social index” measures, but lower levels of satisfaction on the “job setting” and “substance
of work” measures. See AFTER THE JD I, supra note 46, at 50. In After the JD II, larger-firm lawyers
reported higher levels of satisfaction on the “power track,” “social index,” and “work substance”
measures and lower levels of satisfaction on the “job setting” measure. AFTER THE JD II, supra note
47, at 50.
49. See RONIT DINOVITZER ET AL., NALP FOUND. FOR LAW CAREER RESEARCH & EDUC. &
AM. BAR FOUND., AFTER THE JD III: THIRD RESULTS FROM A NATIONAL STUDY OF LEGAL CAREERS
52 (2014) [hereinafter AFTER THE JD III].
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Survey data reported since Organ’s article has been similarly ambiguous.
A study of Michigan Law School graduates published in 2013 reported that,
among survey respondents who had practiced law for five years, “the very large
firm lawyers were the least satisfied with their careers overall among all
settings.”50 But the most recent report from the After the JD study, published
in 2014, once again found that large-firm lawyers reported higher overall
satisfaction than lawyers in smaller firms.51 In addition, a study of Indiana
lawyers overseen by William Henderson and published in 2015 showed largefirm lawyers as more satisfied than small-firm lawyers across most dimensions
of satisfaction, including the feeling that “young people should pursue a legal
career” and that “work is professionally satisfying.”52
In short, the survey data does not definitively answer whether firm size is
correlated with professional dissatisfaction, and it certainly does not tell us a
compelling story of how firm size affects dissatisfaction.
C. Historical Critiques
Others make historical arguments that modern practice environments
frustrate public-regarding ideals of the profession. Robert Gordon, for
example, suggests that practice setting prevents corporate lawyers from serving
the common good through civic service and participation in law-reform
efforts.53 According to Gordon, corporate lawyers once enjoyed relative
independence from their corporate clients and used their positions to positively
influence client conduct and engage in law-reform efforts.54 Corporate
attorneys, for example, served as architects of New Deal regulation.55
Nineteenth century corporate lawyers regularly held high-profile and timeconsuming civic posts.56 Gordon suggests this ideal has eroded in part due to

50. See Chambers, supra note 4, at 24.
51. See AFTER THE JD III, supra note 49, at 52.
52. See William Henderson, Practicing Law in Indiana: Breaking Down the Survey, IND. LAW.,
Nov. 18, 2015, at 10.
53. See Robert W. Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U. L. REV. 1, 48–66 (1988)
54. See id. (discussing historical and current conditions for lawyer independence).
55. See Robert W. Gordon, Corporate Law Practice as a Public Calling, 49 MD. L. REV. 255,
269–74 (1990) (describing corporate lawyers who participated in Progressive reform efforts while also
serving as corporate lawyers).
56. See Gordon, supra note 53, at 59 (“Until the late nineteenth century, private practice was for
most lawyers simply not a full time occupation, but rather an adjunct to participation in politics and
advocacy of public causes.”).

CABLE, MULR VOL. 102, NO. 3 (DO NOT DELETE)

884

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

4/22/2019 9:40 AM

[102:875

“the current conditions of practice.”57 The result, according to Gordon, is a loss
of stature and purpose that affects the profession’s morale.58
Gordon’s analysis is replete with references to “big” and “large” firms. 59
But he does not squarely attribute professional decline to firm size in particular.
Instead, he points to a cluster of attributes commonly associated with, but not
necessarily exclusive to, big law: billable hours requirements,60 business
development expectations,61 requirements for promotion to partner,62 attitudes
toward pro bono work,63 high starting associate salaries,64 and hyperspecialization.65
Similarly, Anthony Kronman argues in The Lost Lawyer: Failing Ideals of
the Legal Profession that lawyers increasingly fall short of a “lawyerstatesman” ideal that once guided the profession, causing a “crisis of morale.”66
Kronman identifies a wide range of factors to explain the profession’s asserted
demise, including changes in legal education, changes in the court system, and
“the explosive growth of the country’s leading law firms.”67
Kronman, more than Gordon, explicitly discusses increasing firm size. He
includes a lengthy summary of the tournament model and recounts evidence
gathered by Galanter and Palay.68 But there is ultimately some question
regarding how central firm size, in particular, is to his analysis. He explains his
focus on large firms in largely practical terms—they have outsized influence
on the profession as standard bearers.69 And many developments emphasized
by Kronman—such as specialization,70 lawyer mobility,71 growing corporate

57. Gordon, supra note 55, at 256.
58. See Gordon, supra note 53, at 48–66; Gordon, supra note 55, at 270–74.
59. See Gordon, supra note 53, at 51–63.
60. See id. at 60.
61. See id.
62. See id.
63. See id. at 60–61.
64. See id. at 60.
65. See Gordon, supra note 55, at 256; Gordon, supra note 53, at 60–63.
66. ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION
2–3 (1993).
67. Id. at 4.
68. See id. at 273–83.
69. See id. at 272–73.
70. See id. at 276–77.
71. See id. at 277–78.
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legal departments,72 and long workdays73—may or may not be products of
increasing firm size.
D. The Synthesis (Conventional Wisdom)
There is a long history of hand wringing over the size of law firms. Galanter
and Palay note that by the 1930s large firms were already pejoratively referred
to as “law factories” by prominent academics and jurists.74
In contemporary scholarship, Patrick Schiltz most sharply and explicitly
associates professional decline and law-firm size. His 1999 essay in the
Vanderbilt Law Review draws on the literatures described above75 and his
personal experience to suggest that the large-firm environment makes new
lawyers both “unhappy” and “unethical.”76 Schiltz warns graduating law
students:
You may do better than I did, but don’t count on it. No matter
how pure your intentions—no matter how firm your resolve—
when you go [to] work at a big firm, the culture will seep in. I
grew up in a lower middle class neighborhood. I literally never
met anyone who could be characterized as wealthy. I almost
never talked about money or thought about money. That all
changed when I started practicing law, despite my best
intentions. Slowly, imperceptibly, the things that I cared about
and the way that I thought about others and the way that I
thought about myself changed. I got sucked into playing the
game, and even today, three years after leaving the big firm, I
still find myself playing the game at times. If you go to a big
firm intending to stay for only a couple years, the job you
choose may be temporary, but the way it affects you may not.77

72. See id. at 283–91.
73. See id. at 300–14.
74. See GALANTER & PALAY, supra note 21, at 16–17 (referring to statements by A. A. Berle
and Harlan Fiske Stone).
75. See Schiltz, supra note 8, at 872. The influence of the literatures described above on Schiltz
are clear by scanning Schiltz’s footnotes. Schiltz cites Galanter and Palay at notes 1, 120, 136, 171,
184, 188, 193, 211, 258, 293, 305, 343, 346, 369, and 370. He cites Kronman at notes 127, 172, 193,
and 303. He cites Gordon at notes 125, 232, 247, 251, 253, 256, 269 274, 297, and 384. He also makes
extensive use of survey research, though it is of an older generation than the particular studies I describe
above. See id. at 881–88. In a response to Schiltz’s article, Galanter and Palay expressed skepticism
about Schiltz’s analysis. See generally Marc S. Galanter & Thomas M. Palay, Large Law Firm Misery:
It’s the Tournament, Not the Money, 52 VAND. L. REV. 953 (1999).
76. See Schiltz, supra note 8, at 872.
77. Id. at 938.
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For Schiltz, the implications are straightforward: law students should avoid
large firms and seek smaller firms in smaller markets.78
Schiltz’s critique of large firms is more strident and direct than the
literatures from which it draws. As discussed above, the tournament model is
essentially descriptive.79 The survey research is, on the whole, ambiguous.80
The historical critiques are somewhat hazy on whether the alleged professional
decline is a large-firm problem in particular.81
In fact, on a close reading of Schiltz’s work, one can find numerous
qualifications to his strong rhetoric. He acknowledges that some small firms
act like large firms and that small firms have some inherent drawbacks.82 He
encourages students to think about differences among large firms because they
are not all the same.83 He recognizes some ambiguity in the survey data.84 But
in the end, he is unapologetic about trying to make a strong and decisive point
(he uses the word “hyperbole”),85 even if his sound bites obscure his more
nuanced moments.
This sharp critique of large firms has especially resonated with legal
scholars and other commentators. In his thorough review of lawyer-satisfaction
literature, Jerome Organ questions Schiltz’s evidence but nonetheless
concludes that “the Schiltz article came to represent . . . the ‘conventional
wisdom’ or the ‘accepted truth’ about the dissatisfaction of lawyers—
particularly big-firm lawyers—that was already manifest in the media in the
1990s and has held sway for the last decade.”86
Schiltz’s critique has been cited hundreds of times in law reviews.87 It
continues to be cited and reproduced in legal ethics texts assigned to law
78. See id. at 940–41.
79. See supra Section II.A.
80. See supra Section II.B.
81. See supra Section II.C.
82. See Schiltz, supra note 8, at 940.
83. See id. at 941 (“[B]ig firms are not alike. Some are better than others.”).
84. See Patrick J. Schiltz, Provoking Introspection: A Reply to Galanter & Palay, Hull, Kelly,
Lesnick, McLaughlin, Pepper, and Traynor, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1033, 1046–50 (1999) (responding to
critiques by Kathleen Hull in a symposium issue dedicated to the original Schiltz piece).
85. See id. at 1035 (“In order to engage the reader’s attention and emotions . . . I have
occasionally used sarcasm and slang and humor and personal experience and, yes, hyperbole.”).
86. Organ, supra note 38, at 239–44 (describing persuasive critiques of the Schiltz article by
Kathleen Hull); see also John S. Dzienkowski, The Future of Big Law: Alternative Legal Service
Providers to Corporate Clients, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 2995, 2997 n.13 (2014) (describing Schiltz’s
piece as “one of the leading articles on dissatisfaction of lawyers working in large firms”).
87. See Organ, supra note 38, at 244 n.91 (reporting that the article had been cited over 250 times
as of December 2010).
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students in their mandatory legal ethics courses.88 And it is made available to
lawyers on websites of bar organizations and other lawyer-support groups.89 In
short, if a participant in the legal community encounters the literature on lawyer
satisfaction and firm size, it is likely Schiltz’s strong rhetoric will be front and
center.
E. Gaps in the Literature
Despite some important contributions noted above, the literature as a whole
has significant gaps regarding how firm size affects lawyer satisfaction.
First, the tournament model and historical critiques lack comparators.
Neither discusses small or medium firms at any length, and legal scholarship in
general has little to say about small or medium firms.90 A focus on large firms
is understandable based on their influence and visibility, but it obfuscates
whether the dynamics those scholars observe are functions of firm size or more
general conditions of practice such as the emergence of professionalized
management, increasing multijurisdictional competition, and increasing
sophistication of corporate clients in purchasing legal services. Moreover, even
if many features of today’s legal profession do derive from increasing firm size,
it is difficult to assess the full implications for lawyers without some sense of
smaller-firm alternatives and their drawbacks.
Second, existing research omits important variation among firms and
lawyers. Realistically, firms are not defined solely by size and presumably
differ in culture, management system, specialization, and economic
arrangements. Lawyers also differ—not only in seniority and basic
demographics—but also by practice-area expertise. Litigators may share little
in common with transactional lawyers, and there is presumably substantial

88. See, e.g., NATHAN M. CRYSTAL, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY: PROBLEMS OF PRACTICE
LIZ RYAN COLE,

AND THE PROFESSION 619 (3d ed. 2004); RICHARD ZITRIN, CAROL M. LANGFORD &
LEGAL ETHICS IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW 74–79 (4th ed. 2013).

89. See, e.g., Professionalism & Ethics, COLO. ATT’Y MENTORING PROGRAM,
http://coloradomentoring.org/mentoring-resources/professionalism-ethics/ [https://perma.cc/Q36UZUS5] (last visited July 30, 2018); Vartges Saroyan, Should You Go to Law School?, AM. B. ASS’N,
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/young_lawyers/publications/tyl/topics/mentoring/should_you_g
o_law_school.html [https://perma.cc/F5U2-BGT6] (last visited July 30, 2018).
90. For an empirical study focusing on ethical considerations at small firms, see generally Leslie
C. Levin, The Ethical World of Solo and Small Law Firm Practitioners, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 309 (2004).
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variation within those broad categories as well.91 Yet the existing literature
rarely focuses on these differences among firms and lawyers.92
For Galanter, Palay, and Henderson, suppressing that variation is
intentional. They purposefully created a model that accentuates similarities in
firm structure.93 Models, of course, are an important step in building theory.
But models also gloss over nuance that should be re-introduced as research
evolves.94
In the survey literature, the rationale for omitting so much important
variation is less obvious. Surveys crudely sort firms into simplistic categories
such as “law firm (251+ lawyers).”95 They rarely collect even basic information
on practice-area expertise beyond “private practice.”96
In sum, the relationship between firm size and professional satisfaction is
under-theorized, despite a strong conventional wisdom. This Article seeks to
address that gap.
III. THE STUDY
In this study, I probed the effects of law firm size by interviewing lawyers
who transitioned from smaller firm settings to larger firm settings through lawfirm mergers. In recent years, there have been a significant number of such

91. See Elizabeth Chambliss, Measuring Law Firm Culture, 52 STUD. L., POL. & SOC’Y 1, 10
(2010) (“[T]here are important differences between litigation and transactional work, as well as
between different types of litigation and transactional work.”). Chambliss advocates for increased
“firm-level data,” meaning thick descriptions of individual firms to understand how different groups
of lawyers interact. See id. at 18.
92. For a qualitative study that focuses on a particular practice area (litigation), see generally
Kimberly Kirkland, Ethics in Large Law Firms: The Principle of Pragmatism, 35 U. MEM. L. REV.
631 (2005) (studying how the large-firm setting affects the ethical consciousness of lawyers and
focusing on litigators in particular).
93. See GALANTER & PALAY, supra note 21, at 1–2 (describing the choice to overlook variation
among firms to provide a useful, if “blurry,” “portrait”). An alternative reading of Galanter and Palay
is that they advance a “convergence thesis” that large firms are becoming increasingly alike. See
Michael J. Kelly, Thinking About the Business of Practicing Law, 52 VAND. L. REV. 985, 986–87
(1999) (critiquing the convergence thesis).
94. A prominent example in legal scholarship is the rational actor model and subsequent
refinement by the field of behavioral economics. See generally Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral
Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1998).
95. E.g., AFTER THE JD II, supra note 47, at 70 (classifying firms by lawyer count).
96. For example, only one of the surveys discussed in this Article sought even the most basic
information about the types of work performed by lawyers or firms. See Richard, supra note 41 at
1055–58 (collecting data on lawyers’ substantive areas of specialization (e.g., real estate, litigation,
etc.)).
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mergers.97 They are one way in which law firms expand into new markets and
practice areas.
Lawyers who join large firms by mergers have a valuable perspective for
several reasons. First, these lawyers have knowledge of both practice
environments. Second, focusing on these lawyers helps isolate the issue of firm
size. Lawyers in acquired firms presumably practice in areas similar to their
larger-firm counterparts and for similar client bases,98 so the absorption of these
lawyers into a large firm by merger is akin to a natural experiment for testing
the effect of firm size on similarly situated lawyers. Finally, some of these
lawyers did not initiate the mergers (they may have been associates or not
among the partners spearheading the merger). For this reason, they might not
feel compelled to justify their career choices in the way that other large-firm
lawyers might.
As reported more fully in Sections III.B & C below, the study produced
several useful observations. A primary insight was that the experiences of
lawyers in large firms are more varied than the conventional wisdom would
suggest. Though some interviewees expressed sentiments consistent with the
conventional wisdom, important counter-narratives with more neutral or
positive views of the large-firm environment emerged. Building on this key
insight, I hypothesize that seniority, practice-area compatibility, local-office
attributes, and manner and rate of firm expansion are key drivers of satisfaction
at large firms. Together, these hypotheses constitute a new framework for
understanding the relationship between firm size and professional satisfaction.
A. Study Design
This is an exploratory study. The purpose of an exploratory study is to
generate “grounded theory” with the understanding that any observations will
require additional confirmation in future research.99 Exploratory studies are
distinguished from the confirmatory studies that constitute the bulk of empirical
research.100 Although it is important to be sensitive to methodological
considerations in exploratory research, representativeness is often “less than
perfect”101 and sample size may be smaller than one would expect in
97. See Jennifer Smith, A Tough Case for Law Firm Mergers, WALL ST. J., Apr. 13, 2014
(“There were 88 mergers of law firms in the U.S. last year—the most since legal consulting firm
Altman Weil Inc. began tracking such deals in 2007.”).
98. Otherwise, they would not be candidates for acquisition by a large firm.
99. See ROBERT A. STEBBINS, EXPLORATORY RESEARCH IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 1–9 (2001)
(defining exploratory research).
100. See id. at 9–12 (distinguishing exploratory research from confirmatory research).
101. Id. at 27.
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confirmatory research.102 Exploratory studies are appropriate where existing
theoretical frameworks do not exist, are in need of updating, or have substantial
gaps.103
In this study, I conducted semi-structured interviews with nineteen lawyers
who described eleven unique mergers. The largest number of interviewees for
a particular merger was five. I had a single interviewee for six of the mergers.
The acquired (small) firms ranged from seven to 200 lawyers. The
acquiring (large) firms ranged from 500 to 1,200 lawyers. In each case, firm
size at least tripled as a result of the merger. In most cases, the merger resulted
in a much greater increase in firm size (from thirty-five to 1,000 lawyers, for
example).
The mergers spanned a long time period. Although I had originally
intended to limit the interviews to mergers occurring after 2008, I found it
challenging to locate sufficient interview subjects within those parameters, as
described further below. In the end, the earliest merger occurred in 2001 and
the most recent merger occurred in 2016. About half of the mergers occurred
before 2008 and about half in 2008 or later.
Eight of the interviewees were associates at the time of the merger. Eleven
were partners at the time of the merger. Of the associates, three (just under
half) remained at the combined firm at the time of the interview. Of the
partners, seven (over half) remained at the combined firm at the time of the
interview.
I located interview subjects by reviewing lists of mergers produced by lawfirm consultants and asking social and professional acquaintances if they knew
attorneys in the relevant firms.104 I then asked each interviewee for referrals to
other lawyers from the acquired firm (a “snowball” sampling technique).105
It was more challenging than expected to locate willing interviewees in this
manner. As a group, the potential interview subjects are busy professionals. In
addition, the interviewees are still part of professional networks that include
other members of the pre- and post-merger firms. This might have dissuaded
some potential interviewees from “going on record” or making introductions
for this study.

102. See id. at 30–41 (providing examples of exploratory studies with 12 to 60 interviews).
103. See id. at 9 (discussing when exploratory research is appropriate).
104. The consulting firm Altman Weil, Inc. publishes annual lists of law firm mergers. The lists
are available at: ALTMAN WEIL MERGERLINE, http://www.altmanweil.com/mergerline
[https://perma.cc/XLN2-4AWK] (last visited Mar. 11, 2019)
105. See ROBERT S. WEISS, LEARNING FROM STRANGERS: THE ART AND METHOD OF
QUALITATIVE INTERVIEW STUDIES 25 (1994) (describing snowball sampling methods).
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Every research method has weaknesses. In this case, the sample size was
relatively small (though not exceptionally so for exploratory research)106 and
one can debate how representative the interviewees are of large-firm lawyers in
general.
Regarding sample size, I felt that I reached a point of “theoretical
saturation”107 at nineteen interviews. At that point in the research, the themes
that I report in the subsections below were sufficiently vivid for purposes of
generating useful hypotheses.
I do not claim that the lawyers I interviewed are representative of the legal
profession in general. Presumably there was something about them or their
firms that someone perceived as especially compatible with large-firm practice.
In a sense, that was the point of the research project—to seek out lawyers who
were otherwise similarly situated to large-firm lawyers but who initially
practiced in a different organizational setting. The interviewees are best viewed
as representative of lawyers with practice profiles (credentials, clients, and
practice area expertise) eligible for participation in large firms. Even within
this population of potential large-firm lawyers, there is something distinctive
about these lawyers—their integration into a firm by merger—that might set
them apart.
In the end, I believe the methodological advantages of the study outweigh
these concerns. If one wants to develop a theory of law firm size rooted in the
experiences of actual lawyers, it makes sense to talk with lawyers with
experience in both settings. These lawyers are best situated to disentangle firm
size from broader industry factors, such as client demands, increasing
competitiveness, and technological changes. In the end, future research will be
required to confirm the generalizability of my hypotheses. In Section IV, I
make recommendations to guide those future efforts.
B. Primary Observation: Three Narratives
I start by reporting a core observation: outcomes for these lawyers were
more varied than the conventional wisdom suggests. At least three distinct
narratives emerged from the interviews. They included (1) dissatisfaction as a
result of the mergers stemming at least in part from the size of the combined
firm, (2) relative indifference to law firm size, and (3) positive reactions to the
merger stemming at least in part from the size of the combined firm.
106. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
107. See STEBBINS, supra note 99, at 27 (quoting BARNEY G. GLASER & ANSELM L. STRAUSS,
THE DISCOVERY OF GROUNDED THEORY: STRATEGIES FOR QUALITATIVE RESEARCH 60 (1967)).
Theoretical saturation is the point at which a researcher believes no further useful categorizations can
be made by collecting additional samples. See GLASER & STRAUSS, supra, at 60–62.
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Although some lawyers fell squarely in one narrative, other lawyers
displayed ambivalence and echoed more than one of these accounts. For
example, a lawyer might report that his or her practice was helped or unaffected
by the merger, but might also report that the merger was hard on other
constituencies in ways that echo the conventional wisdom. Accordingly, the
narratives are best understood as prominent themes rather than discrete
categories into which individual lawyers can be neatly sorted.
1. Dissatisfaction: Confirming Conventional Wisdom
The statements of some lawyers essentially confirmed the conventional
wisdom. These lawyers spoke nostalgically about their small-firm experience
and less glowingly about their large firms. While some amount of post-merger
dissatisfaction might be attributable to integration problems or general market
trends, firm size also seemed to play a role.
a. Small-Firm Nostalgia
Having chosen to practice in small firms,108 it may not be surprising that
interviewees had favorable things to say about that practice setting. In
particular, interviewees described their small firms as close-knit organizations
with strong culture.
Several interviewees described their smaller firms as having a “family”
atmosphere. The term implied strong personal relationships and consensus in
firm administration. One interviewee explained that in a smaller firm “you
know people” like “neighbors.” In this environment, “you didn’t do anything
that really made anybody unhappy because you knew them and you knew their
families.”109 In some cases, even intricate and sensitive decisions, such as
compensation, were administered collaboratively.110 In other cases, even
associates were consulted about decisions formally reserved to partners, such
as the decision to merge with a larger firm or take on a controversial client.111

108. See infra note 175 and accompanying text (reporting that lawyers targeted smaller firms in
which they felt they would obtain greater experience). But see Interview with Lawyer 8, at 5 (“I had
interviewed with large firms throughout the interview process, and I had no problem whatsoever
working in a large firm. I didn’t really have a preference.”).
109. Interview with Lawyer 7, at 5.
110. See Interview with Lawyer 10, at 3 (describing a distinctive compensation system based on
partner voting).
111. See Interview with Lawyer 13, at 4 (reporting that associates were asked to elect a
representative to participate in merger due diligence and negotiations).
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In this close-knit environment, smaller firms developed strong culture in
the form of shared values and practices.112 For example, multiple interviewees
described their small firms as having a distinctively strong commitment to high
professional standards. Interviewees reported that their smaller firms
particularly valued elite academic credentials, such as prestigious judicial
clerkships.113 These recruiting practices reflected a broader emphasis on
intellectual achievement and high professional standards (being “good
lawyers”).114
In some cases, this shared commitment to high professional standards was
as important to the firm as profitability.115 One interviewee explained:
Virtually every one that was there had come from a top five or
top 10 law school, was on law review, [had completed
clerkships], top of their class. [They were] a bunch of
eggheads in a way. [T]he partners really weren’t all that
interested in making a lot of money which is odd in this day
and age, but it was more like people who loved the law type of
112. The term “culture” can be hard to define when applied to a business organization. See John
Coleman, Six Components of a Great Corporate Culture, HARV. BUS. REV. (May 6, 2013),
https://hbr.org/2013/05/six-components-of-culture [https://perma.cc/U8U4-QNL4] (identifying the
following six components of corporate culture: vision, values, practices, people, narrative, and place).
I use the term to mean shared values and practices. For a more technical description of the concept of
culture, see Chambliss, supra note 91, at 11–18.
113. See Interview with Lawyer 3, at 1 (“We had had many, for instance, US Supreme Court
clerks.”); Interview with Lawyer 5, at 1 (“[W]e thought of ourselves as pretty elite; we had three or
four or five court clerks and had a great esprit de corps.”); Interview with Lawyer 6, at 1 (“[The firm]
attracted an unusually large number of former judicial law clerks.”); Interview with Lawyer 8, at 1 (“It
recruited from what I would just call the ‘fanciest’ law schools and the top of the class. . . . [I]t would
be very, very hard for somebody who didn’t have those credentials to work there.”); Interview with
Lawyer 11, at 1 (describing the firm as “brainy” and reporting that it hired a lot of Supreme Court
clerks).
114. Interview with Lawyer 1, at 1 (stating that lawyers at the firm cared about being “good
lawyers”); Interview with Lawyer 7, at 1 (stating that everybody who was a “good lawyer” could make
partner); Interview with Lawyer 8, at 2 (stating that the firm valued “[s]pending that extra 100 hours”
to make the work product “ideal rather than something that’s just very good and done in an efficient
way”); Interview with Lawyer 10, at 10 (stating that the firm valued doing interesting work and
enjoying the practice of law).
115. Interview with Lawyer 1, at 1 (reporting that the firm was “filled with very intelligent
people that cared about being amazing lawyers”); Interview with Lawyer 2, at 1 (“It had the Supreme
Court clerks who worked there and stuff like that; they became partners there and that kind of helped
set its tone a little bit.”); Interview with Lawyer 6, at 1-2 (“It was somewhat, I guess I’d say academic,
and there was an unusually large number of people that would come there for a few years and then go
into academia”); Interview with Lawyer 8, at 1 (“It had a reputations being very academic in nature.
A lot of people would come to the firm intending to go into academics afterwards, and a lot of them in
fact did that.”).
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thing.116
Consistent with these priorities, some of the smaller firms invested heavily
in associate training117 and evaluated associates holistically for promotion—
focusing on overall development as a lawyer and quality of work product more
than profitability metrics. For example, one interviewee stated that, when
making partnership decisions at the smaller firm, “the true measure of your
success was, are you invested in making this place better” and not “who works
the most.” 118
To be clear, the paragraphs above do not perfectly describe life at every, or
any single, small firm. At a certain level of detail, firms had idiosyncratic
founding visions, management structures, and business models. Moreover,
interviewees ultimately identified offsetting disadvantages of small firms that I
will develop in sections below. Nonetheless, a critical mass of interviewees
identified the essential elements described above—a close-knit workplace with
strong culture and shared values. And so this composite sketch of small-firm
life can serve as one useful starting place for exploring the effects of increasing
firm size.
b. The Move to Big Law
By some accounts, the favorable institutional features described above were
diluted or absent after a merger. Though individual large firms varied in
important ways, interviewees identified important common threads.
Specifically, the personal connections between lawyers weakened in larger
firms, resulting in less distinct culture and a greater emphasis on profitability
metrics. These observations are consistent with the conventional wisdom.119

116. Interview with Lawyer 7, at 1; see also Interview with Lawyer 5, at 1 (describing the firm’s
goal as “being the smartest people in the room”); Interview with Lawyer 8, at 1 (describing the firm’s
commitment to elite credentials and stating it was “good for the overall level of intelligence of the
firm,” but may not have led to lawyers who were “business savvy”).
117. See Interview with Lawyer 13, at 5 (“[I]t was very, very focused on training . . . some of
the partners were more like professors in some ways than partners.”).
118. Interview with Lawyer 1, at 2; see also Interview with Lawyer 8, at 3 (describing
partnership criteria based on “legal merit” and ability to service long-term clients, rather than on “the
business case”); Interview with Lawyer 16, at 2 (explaining that partnership determination were made
through “touch and feel” in a holistic review process rather than a metric-driven system).
119. See Galanter & Henderson, supra note 32, at 1898 (noting that geographically dispersed
firms may have more full-time managers but, paradoxically, less ability to cultivate firm culture).
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In contrast to the familial feel of small firms, many interviewees described
larger firms as having more hierarchy and “bureaucracy.”120 Interviewees
explained that firm governance involved more layers of authority and more
complex committee structures.121 Even basic reimbursement policies became
more complex.122 The presence of non-lawyer personnel was another
indication of more elaborate and professionalized management.123
In some cases, this more hierarchical approach seemed to replace the shared
values and culture found in smaller firms. Though some interviewees claimed
that their larger and smaller firms had compatible cultures,124 other interviewees
struggled to identify any discernable culture at their larger firm.125
Many interviewees described their larger firms as squarely focused on
profitability. They used terms like “hard-nosed”,126 “bottom-line driven,”127
and “really . . . interested in the money.”128 This focus manifested in
partnership determinations and compensation decisions, which were based on

120. See Interview with Lawyer 1, at 11 (describing the larger firm as “more rules-based” and
discussing forms and procedures); Interview with Lawyer 15, at 10 (“[C]learly at the larger firm there
is more bureaucracy.”).
121. See Interview with Lawyer 2, at 15 (describing associate and affinity group committees);
Interview with Lawyer 16, at 2 (reporting that the larger firm was not as “nimble” and had multiple
levels of decision-making).
122. See Interview with Lawyer 15, at 10 (describing “more rigid” expense accounting and
reimbursement policies).
123. See Interview with Lawyer 3, at 7 (describing “professional” staff, but suggesting they have
limited decision-making authority); Interview with Lawyer 6, at 10–11 (“[A]t the old firm, there were
very few non-lawyer management types, certainly not management types that had much impact on
lawyers. At the new firm, there’s significantly more . . . non-practicing lawyers in management and
administrative roles.”).
124. See Interview with Lawyer 2, at 11 (“[T]he culture does matter more than I would have
guessed and it was actually a pretty decent fit.”); Interview with Lawyer 5, at 6 (“I don’t think there is
a particular cultural difference now.”); Interview with Lawyer 10, at 9 (“I was very pleasantly
surprised, you know, going to my first partner conference after the merger immediately, thinking these
people are just like the people I’ve practiced law with all my life.”); Interview with Lawyer 14, at 9
(describing a “no a**hole policy” at the new firm and its positive effect on firm culture); Interview
with Lawyer 16, at 2 (describing a larger firm as being a good culture firm even if some people had
“sharp elbows”).
125. See Interview with Lawyer 13, at 11 (reporting that there was no distinct culture at the larger
firm and that it “just seemed like a collection of people that did their own thing”).
126. Interview with Lawyer 2, at 11.
127. Interview with Lawyer 5, at 7.
128. Interview with Lawyer 7, at 8–9.
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profitability metrics (such as billable hours and business development) rather
than more holistic criteria.129
It was not always clear whether negative attributes of larger firms were
really a product of firm size and scope. More than one interviewee reported
that smaller firms had also been changing over time. For example, interviewees
noted that partnership tracks had lengthened at most firms, large or small.130
Several interviewees attributed these changes to an increasingly competitive
market, which I will discuss in more detail in subsections below.
But interviewees also explained how law firm size did explain some of the
perceived differences post-merger. It can be hard for a large firm to reach
consensus on what constitutes good performance, and to evaluate when the
chosen criteria has been met, when decision-makers do not regularly work with
the majority of the lawyers they are evaluating.131 As one interviewee put it,
larger firms may “default” to profitability metrics because more subjective
evaluations of performance become difficult absent personal interaction.132
Given the circumstances described above, it may not be surprising that
many interviewees reported high attrition rates after the merger.133 While a
certain number of departures would have been expected even without a merger,
there was a sense among interviewees that the merger in particular was to blame
for some lawyers leaving.134
129. See infra text accompanying notes 132 and 172 (describing compensation and promotion
policies at large firms).
130. See Interview with Lawyer 3, at 1 (reporting that partnership tracks had been lengthening
at “almost all firms”); Interview with Lawyer 10, at 1–2 (reporting that partnership tracks had been
getting longer); Interview with Lawyer 12, at 5 (reporting that the firm’s lengthening partnership track
was “following a general trend in the market”).
131. For example, one interviewee explained how the shared values held by lawyers at his
smaller firm had helped with compensation decisions:
[I]f people just worked for money, it would really be easy to motivate and manage
people. There are other things that people work for and the compensation
program has to reward and incentivize; the two primary goals. And if everyone
shares those objectives, and again, not to say there weren’t outliers at times, but
most people doing a conscientious job about it will do it correctly.
Interview with Lawyer 15, at 3.
132. See Interview with Lawyer 16, at 2.
133. See Interview with Lawyer 2, at 17 (describing an “exodus of people” at the time of the
merger); Interview with Lawyer 8, at 5–6 (reporting that only two associates from the former firm
remained at the larger firm); Interview with Lawyer 11, at 2 (reporting that, within two years of the
merger, about half of the smaller firm lawyers left the big firm, and that all but five left by fifteen years
after the merger); Interview with Lawyer 18, at 4 (stating that only about 5% of the smaller firm
attorneys remained at the larger firm).
134. See Interview with Lawyer 5, at 4–5 (stating that a “terrific” group of senior associates left
“because of the merger”).
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In sum, a segment of the interviewees explained that merging with a larger
firm negatively affected their professional lives, and the size of the firm was at
least one reason why.
2. Indifference: A Profession of Lawyers, Not Firms
In contrast to the conventional wisdom, some interviewees suggested that
organizational features of law firms did not greatly affect their professional
lives.
First, some conditions of practice that are commonly associated with “big
law” were present in smaller firms too. For example, most interviewees
described working just as many hours, if not more, in their smaller firms. One
interviewee explained, “[W]e worked pretty hard at the old firm
and . . . sometimes there were folks who didn’t work at the same energy and
they didn’t tend to stay around too long.”135 In addition, most of these firms
tried to remain competitive with starting salaries at national firms in order to
recruit the most talented associates.136 The smaller firms also served largely
national client bases—going head to head with large firms to win business and
impress clients.137 Notably, very few interviewees expressed any desire for
greater work-life balance—the smaller firms were not what might be called

135. Interview with Lawyer 15, at 3–4; see also Interview with Lawyer 2, at 7 (reporting that
“[w]orkload was basically about the same” at the smaller and larger firms); Interview with Lawyer 10,
at 4 (“[M]ost people were billing over 2,000 hours and some were probably billing more like 2,800
hours.”); Interview with Lawyer 13, at 2 (“People worked really hard, I mean it wasn’t uncommon for
people to bill 2,200 to 2,400 hours or more a year.”); Interview with Lawyer 14, at 3 (“[T]he workload
of the old firm was sort of consistent with what I would find elsewhere.”).
136. See Interview with Lawyer 2, at 6 (reporting that the smaller firm partners tried to match
larger firm associate compensation to maintain themselves as “heavy hitters”); Interview with Lawyer
4, at 2 (reporting that compensation was “top of market”); Interview with Lawyer 13, at 2 (reporting
that associate compensation was “always the same as the big firm level and in fact for a while . . . it
was actually a little bit higher”); Interview with Lawyer 14, at 2 (reporting that “compensation was
competitive as far as I could tell”). Despite these competitive base salaries, some interviewees did
report lower annual bonus opportunities at their smaller firms. See Interview with Lawyer 2, at 6;
Interview with Lawyer 4, at 2.
137. See Interview with Lawyer 4, at 1 (describing “a relatively small firm doing big, big firm
work”); Interview with Lawyer 6, at 1 (reporting that the smaller firm had “almost exclusively national
clients” and not “a whole lot of $500,000-type disputes”); Interview with Lawyer 10, at 2 (describing
national clients); Interview with Lawyer 13, at 1 (describing the smaller firm’s matters as “high-stakes
IP and also antitrust litigation”); Interview with Lawyer 15, at 4 (reporting that the firm’s litigation
department had “national and international clients”).
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“lifestyle firms.”138 These lawyers were primarily interested in working on “the
most interesting, most important, most demanding cases.”139
Second, interviewees described some large firms as relatively weak or
diffuse organizations. For example, interviewees stated that some large firms
mostly failed in their efforts to foster interoffice staffing and cross-selling.
Though proponents of the mergers often cited such inter-office cooperation as
a major benefit of merging,140 individual lawyers’ workflows remained largely
siloed in local offices. As one lawyer explained:
[Y]ou had partners from the old firm who continued to run it
like the old firm and didn’t want to have cross-office staffing
because they didn’t know X, Y, Z associate from D.C. or New
York . . . and had no way to tell if they were good or not and
didn’t really want to work with them.141
With formal managers having limited ability to influence individual lawyer
activities,142 individual rainmakers continued to be the firms’ real centers of
power.143 As one interviewee put it, the result was a collection of local
“fiefdoms” rather than a fully integrated firm.144
Perhaps it should not be surprising that law-firm setting plays a relatively
minor role for some lawyers. In economic jargon, hierarchical management is
associated with particularly complex production challenges.145 A loose

138. See Interview with Lawyer 2, at 7 (“[I]t wasn’t like a lifestyle firm.”).
139. Interview with Lawyer 3, at 7.
140. In the jargon of law firm management, one goal of these mergers was to create a larger
“platform” for servicing clients and attracting work. See Interview with Lawyer 15, at 8 (describing
being excited about the merger because it would create a new “platform and opportunity for growth”);
Interview with Lawyer 18, at 2–3 (describing one goal of the merger as creating a “larger platform”).
141. Interview with Lawyer 2, at 17; see also Interview with Lawyer 4, at 6 (“[E]verybody was
still in the same office, working with the same people.”); Interview with Lawyer 7, at 10 (stating that
the smaller firm still generates its own work); Interview with Lawyer 8, at 7 (reporting that “a lot of
my work remained the same” after the merger); Interview with Lawyer 11, at 2 (“Workflows did not
change that much.”); Interview with Lawyer 12, at 6 (reporting little “crosspollination”); Interview
with Lawyer 15, at 11 (“No there is not much cross-selling”); Interview with Lawyer 16, at 2
(describing cross-selling and collaboration across offices as “overblown”).
142. See Interview with Lawyer 18, at 5–6 (describing “authoritarian” emails from management
and stating that “lawyers just don’t take that really well, particularly people who are more senior and
have done this for a while”).
143. See Interview with Lawyer 7, at 7–8 (“I have enough business that no one can f*** with
me.”); Interview with Lawyer 18, at 5–6 (“[T]he most powerful with the biggest book of business from
the biggest city . . . were probably getting listened to.”).
144. See Interview with Lawyer 18, at 5–6.
145. See Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85
VA. L. REV. 247, 276–80 (1999).
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affiliation of actors might struggle to manufacture products on a large scale,
develop and market a sophisticated technology, or carry out a disciplined
branding or marketing campaign.146 In these settings, the cost of bureaucracy
is justified.147
But the indifference narrative described in this subpart calls into question
how much “team production” really goes on at law firms. Lawyers may often
work independently or in small groups with less coordination than hoped for.
And so, relatively informal centers of power (the local rainmaker) may persist,
despite the trappings of professionalized and centralized management. Put
another way, lawyers may feel that firms are increasingly hierarchical, but the
hierarchy might be somewhat superficial and law firms may in fact be relatively
de-centralized compared to corporate America at large.
In sum, law-firm setting may not always have the significance we think it
does. It is possible that some lawyers combine, separate, and recombine in a
variety of configurations without fundamentally altering their practice.
3. Contentment: Safety in Numbers
Perhaps my most provocative finding was a set of lawyers who put the
conventional wisdom on its head. For these lawyers, the law firm environment
was an important determinant of professional satisfaction. But contrary to the
conventional wisdom, the large-firm environment mitigated, rather than
produced, professional anxiety.
a. Large Firms as Risk Pooling
The starting point for this counter-narrative is a fuller understanding of
small law firms. Despite some of the favorable descriptions of small firms
above, it is clear that small firms carry some big business risks.
These risks surfaced when I asked lawyers about the stated reasons for the
mergers. A number of lawyers cited “succession” problems as founding
partners or lawyers with key client relationships neared retirement age.148 For
146. See id.
147. See id. at 265–76 (discussing how “mediating hierarchies” solve incentive problems
associated with team production).
148. See Interview with Lawyer 2, at 3 (stating that the smaller firm was unsuccessful in
implementing a “long-term succession plan”); Interview with Lawyer 3, at 7 (“[W]e had a somewhat
aging partnership and it wasn’t completely clear where the next generation was going to come from.”);
Interview with Lawyer 4, at 4–5 (describing a perception that “as [the] older generation left, there
wasn’t a way to make it work”); Interview with Lawyer 8, at 2 (“The 70 somethings are running the
cases still, rather than the 40 and 50 somethings.”); Interview with Lawyer 15, at 6 (“[W]e had
succession issues.”).
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example, one interviewee explained that the smaller firm’s initial founders
handed down business to “a generation of people, who by the time of the merger
were in their . . . mid to late 60s.”149 According to the interviewee, that
generation of lawyers had “expanded the base of business from those clients
but never really expanded the client base.”150 The result was a firm oriented
towards helping service existing clients but with limited experience with new
client development, creating a concern that “when those older guys retired the
firm would fall apart because those clients might not stay with the firm and then
the firm would have no business.”151
In addition to succession problems, smaller firms sometimes lacked
diversification in practice areas or clients. For example, one interviewee
described anxiety stemming from the smaller firm’s dependence on a particular
kind of large litigation matter:
[T]here would be some one-off very large pieces of litigation
that would keep a lot of people busy, and each time one of those
was resolved, there would always be some concern, what’s
gonna fill the void? Every time, something else would, in fact,
fill the void, but there was concern that that might not always
happen. Being dependent on just a few large clients where
those large clients change every few years meant that we had
some risk.152
Other interviewees reported that their smaller firms were especially
affected by economic downturn in the early 2000s due to their narrow focuses
on a particular area of practice or geography.153
Finally, a number of lawyers described a changing client preference for
large “brand name” firms. These lawyers reported that clients in every local
market had increasing choice of firms for high-stakes legal work,154 and clients

149. Interview with Lawyer 7, at 5–6.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Interview with Lawyer 6, at 5.
153. See Interview with Lawyer 5, at 3 (suggesting that the firm did “less well than our
competitors” after the dot-com bubble); Interview with Lawyer 12, at 3 (suggesting that smaller firms
were more affected by recession than larger firms); Interview with Lawyer 16, at 1 (discussing the
firm’s challenges following the dot-com bubble due to its practice area focus).
154. See Interview with Lawyer 3, at 8 (discussing the increasing number of Am Law 100 firms
operating in the smaller firm’s local market); Interview with Lawyer 5, at 4 (reporting “more
competition, increasing numbers of major firms putting down their stakes” in the local market);
Interview with Lawyer 15, at 5 (discussing the expansion of East Coast law firms into West Coast
cities).
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were increasingly apprehensive to pick a small firm that lacked the same namerecognition as larger competitors.155 As one interviewee explained:
I think the industry had changed. I think that a Fortune 100
company 20 or 25 years ago with some big piece of litigation
was more willing to go to a litigation boutique . . . . There’s
this view that if you’re the general counsel of some enormous
company, and some enormous shareholders class action
lawsuit gets filed against you, if you hire Skadden and things
don’t go well, no one’s ever gonna blame you for having
[hired] Skadden[.] If you hire some litigation boutique . . . and
things don’t go well, you may get second guessed.156
In sum, more than one interviewee questioned the overall “viability” of
their smaller firm.157
With these small-firm risks in mind, the decision to merge with a larger
firm can be understood as a flight to safety. In a larger firm, a single partner or
client defection would seem less likely to present existential threats to firm
viability.158 And a larger firm, with diverse practice areas and geographic
markets, might be better positioned than a smaller firm to withstand a downturn
in a particular market or practice area.159
Relatedly, joining a national firm provided the brand name and resources
expected by large corporate clients.160 For lawyers who highly valued working
on the largest and highest profile matters, remaining competitive for that work
was an important determinant of professional satisfaction.
155. See Interview with Lawyer 10, at 5 (speculating that clients “wanted a brand name” so they
wouldn’t “be criticized”); Interview with Lawyer 12, at 3 (stating that client work was “going to the
firms with the bigger reputation in that type of work”).
156. Interview with Lawyer 6, at 5–6.
157. See Interview with Lawyer 2, at 18 (stating that the “old firm wasn’t really financially viable
in the long run”); Interview with Lawyer 5, at 3 (stating that “there was sort of a general skepticism
about the viability of a firm like ours”); see also Interview with Lawyer 6, at 5 (“At some point,
management started saying, look, our kind of firm isn’t part of the future.”); Interview with Lawyer
12, at 1 (“I think the smaller firms felt like they might be in danger of having to take some kind of
drastic action, whether it’s shutting their doors or something else.”); Interview with Lawyer 18, at 2–
3 (reporting that the smaller firm lawyers were told by management that “We must [merge] to
survive”).
158. See Gilson & Mnookin, supra note 20, at 321–29 (discussing benefits from diversification
at large law firms).
159. One interviewee, for example, explained how a firm with a balance between transactional
and litigation work might be able to smooth the ups and downs of the mergers and acquisitions market.
See Interview with Lawyer 6, at 13 (analogizing transactional and litigation departments to equity and
fixed-income investments).
160. See Interview with Lawyer 15, at 8 (stating that the lawyer was excited about the merger
because if “provided a great platform” to expand into new markets).
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b. Outsourcing Firm Administration
For some interviewees, the large-firm apparatus also appeared to insulate
the practice of law from the business of law. Some lawyers seemed mostly
happy ceding decision making to centralized and professional management. As
one interviewee stated in regards to firm management: “I don’t care
whether . . . it’s done by someone in [my city] or someone . . . at firm
headquarters as long as it’s done efficiently.”161
Other interviewees expressed relief that larger firms employed non-lawyers
to perform business functions. One interviewee emphasized the superior IT
support at the larger firm:
[The smaller firm] was an old-fashioned kind of firm. We
didn’t even have a network . . . . If you and I were writing a
brief together, I would have a draft and then I would email it to
you, then you’d work on it, and you’d email it back to me and
hopefully somebody would store the file version on their hard
drive somewhere. Really, the computer systems and the
sophistication of the computers is the biggest thing in my mind
that separates the old firm from the new firm.162
Another interviewee spoke about the advantages of having other types of
administrative support:
[The new firm has] non-lawyer professionals that do a lot of
things that I would have never thought to rely on people to do.
Like . . . keep track of when your clients’ bills aren’t paid, in a
nice way nudging them to pay, and answering a questionnaire,
putting together responses to requests or proposals for work
and things like that, and I actually really like that now.163
While improved IT support and help with collections may sound trivial
individually, the broader point is that a professionalized management structure
can be professionally liberating.164 At least one interviewee cited increased
administrative support as a primary driver of the merger.165

161. Interview with Lawyer 5, at 8.
162. Interview with Lawyer 8, at 4–5.
163. Interview with Lawyer 7, at 8.
164. See Interview with Lawyer 8, at 10 (discussing how administrative personnel free lawyers
from coordinating some aspects of recruiting); Interview with Lawyer 11, at 2 (describing “new
resources” at the new firm such as better technology).
165. See Interview with Lawyer 15, at 7. This lawyer explained:
[A]t the smaller firm our managing partner and Chair had full time practice and
we were large enough to dedicate a lawyer full time to those roles and they just
put [in] an extraordinary amount of effort . . . . [A]t larger firms, you have
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Similar themes surfaced in discussions of service partners at large law
firms. By “service partners” I mean lawyers who reach partner status at a firm,
but contribute mostly expertise rather than selling legal services (rainmaking).
One interviewee explained:
At the larger firm, there was room for service partners. [Being
a service partner is] not as comfortable a place in the large firm
and maybe you can grow out of it, you know, grow into larger
things, but it’s a place to start and it’s a long-term position.166
As the quote above suggests, status as a service partner has drawbacks. As
one interviewee colorfully stated, “I doubt the firm exists where you are not
better off landing the whale than helping people take the blubber off.”167 But
for those disinclined towards firm management and business development, the
tradeoff may be worth it.
While it is possible to be a service partner at a smaller firm, it stands to
reason that a service partner at a smaller firm would have fewer sources of work
and could be more severely affected by a single departing rainmaker. For some
lawyers, then, the large-firm environment may provide relief from the heavy
burdens of client development, albeit with diminished stature in the firm.
In sum, lawyers in certain practice areas face intense competition for what
they perceive as the most professionally satisfying work. In some ways, this
competition is more directly felt in a small firm and may lead to existential
questions of the firm’s viability. At the least, a small and leanly staffed firm
requires all participants to bear the burdens of firm management. Some lawyers
would happily give up some autonomy and suffer some bureaucracy in order to
pool risk and offload administrative tasks.
C. An Explanatory Framework
Collectively, the interviewees reported a complex relationship between
firm size and professional satisfaction. While some interviewees echoed the
conventional wisdom,168 others provided more neutral or favorable accounts of
the large-firm setting.169 Together with the ambiguity of the survey data
described in Section II, these results caution against the straightforward causal
managing partners and management assistants where that’s all that they do. We
couldn’t do that as a smaller firm.
Id.
166. Interview with Lawyer 4, at 9; see also Interview with Lawyer 14, at 4–5 (“By supporting
other partners throughout the firm and working on national clients, . . . I realized that I
had . . . developed this expertise in a practice area, but had no direct clients of my own.”).
167. Interview with Lawyer 17, at 7–8.
168. See supra Section III.B.1.
169. See supra Sections III.B.2 and III.B.3.
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connection between firm size and dissatisfaction suggested by the conventional
wisdom.
This Section presents a series of hypotheses for explaining the varied
experiences of large-firm lawyers. The hypotheses focus on the effects of: (1)
seniority, (2) the compatibility of the lawyer’s legal specialization (“practice
area”) with large-firm economics, (3) geographic dispersion within a firm, and
(4) the stress that extraordinary expansion places on firms and lawyers.
Together, these hypotheses constitute a conceptual framework for
understanding the relationship between firm size and professional satisfaction.
1. Seniority
Some differences between smaller and larger firms were particularly salient
for associates facing evaluation for promotion to partner. This hypothesis that
the current large-firm environment is more difficult for developing lawyers is
consistent with the conventional wisdom and some survey data.170 But it
warrants elaboration here because it was noticeable in the interviewees’
testimonies.
Interviewees explained that the criteria for making partner in larger firms
was more focused on “numbers” such as billable hours, realization rates, and
business development.171 One interviewee explained:
[Y]ou are no longer one of 10 people in your class, you’re one
of 300 people in your class, and so . . . if I ever do want to
become a partner how am I going to attract people in [other]
offices who have never worked with me, who don’t know me,
but they are making the decision of whether I am going to be
partner or not? And so . . . your hours matter because it’s not
just the people that you see every day that are judging your
performances, it’s just these people that have no idea other than
your numbers and you have to impress.172

170. For example, Schiltz specifically addresses his article to law students and focuses largely
on associate issues. See Schiltz, supra note 8, at 872 (starting the piece with “Dear Law Student”). For
an entertaining presentation of evidence regarding associate dissatisfaction, see generally William D.
Henderson & David Zaring, Young Associates in Trouble, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1087, 1096–1102 (2007).
171. See Interview with Lawyer 2, at 14 (describing the evaluation criteria as more “quantified”
and having “a little bit less forgiveness if you don’t hit a certain hard number”); Interview with Lawyer
7, at 11 (“[T]he big difference between the two firms in terms of evaluating people for partner is that
what they call here the business case is more important than your skills.”); Interview with Lawyer 16,
at 2 (describing the large firm’s partnership evaluation process as “metrics driven”).
172. Interview with Lawyer 1, at 9.
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Interviewees also reported that it took longer to make partner at a larger
firm,173 and that the probability of making partner was lower at a larger firm.174
By some accounts, day-to-day workflows also changed in ways that
adversely affected associates’ development as lawyers. Several interviewees
explained that they had chosen to work at small firms because they hoped to
get more experience earlier in their careers.175 With larger firms taking on
larger matters and trying to staff matters across offices, associates felt that their
work assignments at large firms provided less meaningful experience. One
interviewee explained:
[T]he selling point [for the smaller firm] . . . was that if you
went to this firm, you would get meaningful experience, year
one, which is kind of hard to come by in large firms . . . . [At
the small firm,] you will have interesting cases and you will
have meaningful engagement with them in your first year.
You’re not just going to be spending it doing doc
review . . . [and] legal research and memos behind the scene.
You’re going to be drafting pretty independently. You’re
going to be running things on your own in your first year.176
To an extent, lawyers with mature practices were insulated from these
concerns. As one senior lawyer bluntly put it, “I have enough business that no
one can f*** with me.”177
On the other hand, the role of seniority should not be overstated. Just under
half of the interviewees who were associates at the time of the merger remained
at the larger firm at the time of the interview. And at least one interviewee
discussed “de-equitizations” (demotions from partnership status) at the larger
firm, suggesting that even senior lawyers could not rest on their laurels in
today’s legal profession.178
173. See Interview with Lawyer 2, at 13 (describing a ten-year partnership track at the larger
firm); Interview with Lawyer 8, at 8 (describing a partnership track that is in effect an eleven-year track
because associates are first elevated to non-equity partner and then equity partner).
174. See Interview with Lawyer 2, at 13 (stating that the larger firm had a “more restrictive idea”
of who should be a partner); Interview with Lawyer 5, at 3 (reporting that at the larger firm an
associate’s chances of becoming a partner “were small” even if they were “terrific associates”);
Interview with Lawyer 7, at 1 (reporting that anyone who “stayed long enough” and was a “decent
lawyer” would make partner at the smaller firm).
175. See Interview with Lawyer 1, at 5 (describing a desire to work at a locally based law firm
to obtain exposure to local clients and gain experience on smaller matters); Interview with Lawyer 13,
at 2 (reporting that the lawyer selected the firm because of compensation and “because it was a smaller
firm, they gave their associate a greater degree of responsibility early on”).
176. Interview with Lawyer 2, at 8.
177. Interview with Lawyer 7, at 7–8.
178. See Interview with Lawyer 16, at 2 (reporting that the larger firm went through a “deequitization” process).
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2. Practice-Area Compatibility
According to these interviews, the large-firm environment is not equally
compatible with all practice areas found in large firms. For example, one
interviewee explained how a sophisticated but localized real estate practice was
difficult to integrate into a larger firm. The interviewee humorously recounted
how clients reacted to marketing materials featuring the new firm’s global
reach:
We would receive emails that would be . . . “For general
distribution to your client list.” And I would read them and I
would try to think of anyone I could send them to. [I] was
trying really hard to make this work so I think, “I’ll send this
out and see what they say.” And half the time they send me
back a sort of kidding email about, “Oh, gosh. Well, if I’m
ever in [Burundi] I’ll keep you guys in mind.” I mean it just
wasn’t my client base.179
This interviewee was not alone in describing a strained fit between practice
area and firm environment. Interviewees cited estate planning, patent
prosecution, and certain regulatory work as practice areas that were either
especially rate sensitive or insufficiently “leveraged” (i.e., they did not occupy
enough associate time) for large firms.180 While firms may maintain these
practice areas to provide full service to clients and generate “cross-selling”
opportunities, individual lawyers in these practice areas potentially faced
professional frustrations such as a diminished client base,181 mid-career retooling,182 or diminished status as a service partner.183
Based on these accounts, we might think of different practice areas as lying
along a continuum with a large firm being essential on one end of the continuum
and large-firm economics being totally incompatible on the other end.184
Several practice areas, such as the examples described above, fall somewhere
in the middle. For lawyers in these practice areas, smaller firms might also be

179. Interview with Lawyer 18, at 8. I have changed the name of the city to assist with
confidentiality.
180. See Interview with Lawyer 9, at 17–18 (discussing regulatory work); Interview with Lawyer
17, at 9–10 (discussing estate planning and patent prosecution).
181. See Interview with Lawyer 19, at 1–2 (discussing loss of certain estate planning clients due
to firm economics).
182. See Interview with Lawyer 9, at 16–18 (discussing the need to change practice focus to
accommodate the larger firm’s cost structure).
183. See Interview with Lawyer 17, at 9–10 (discussing the difficulty of being a service partner
at large firm).
184. See supra text accompanying notes 154–156 (discussing client preferences for large firms).
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viable, or even superior, and the large-firm setting may come to represent
professional frustration, unhelpful bureaucracy, and diluted culture.
For researchers, at least two implications follow. First, certain practice
areas are likely to be over-represented in any study of large-firm lawyers
because firms will ultimately migrate towards the most compatible specialties.
Those practice areas may have stress-inducing features besides firm size, such
as intense competition, demanding corporate clients, and high financial stakes.
To the extent researchers find a correlation between firm size and
dissatisfaction, it may be that these other features, and not firm size, are the
driving factor.
Second, firm size may explain some degree of professional dissatisfaction,
but disproportionately in certain practice groups. In other words, the
conventional wisdom might ring true for a large-firm lawyer specializing in
estate planning or patent prosecution, but it may fail to capture important
benefits of a large firm for a lawyer specializing in corporate debt offerings.
Accordingly, understanding any observed dissatisfaction in large firms requires
attention to the interaction of both firm size and the economics of individual
practice areas.
3. Importance of the Local Office
A national brand might appeal to some clients, but firms vary in their ability
to actually operate as a cohesive national organization.185 As described above,
workflows often remained siloed in local offices despite a firm’s best intentions
to facilitate interoffice collaboration.186 Effectively, management power
sometimes resided in local “fiefdoms” regardless of formal management
structures.187 Accordingly, the local office, rather than the larger firm
apparatus, largely defined the experiences of some interviewees.
It is possible that these experiences are not representative of large firms in
general. Because these lawyers joined their larger firms through a merger, the
new lawyers were already a cohesive group that might have been relatively
more difficult to integrate into the larger firm. As one interviewee explained:
[E]ven though we were being swallowed up by [a] larger firm,
locally in [our market] we were doing the swallowing.
Something like 10, 15 folks from the new firm moved over into
our offices at the old firm. And so it felt from [our] perspective
that very little had changed in a way. Because everybody was
185. See supra Section III.B.2.
186. See supra Section III.B.2.
187. See supra Section III.B.2.
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still in the same office, working with the same people every
day.188
But there were also indications that geographic dispersion created more
fundamental challenges that transcended merger integration problems. For
example, one interviewee described the (sometimes unsuccessful) efforts that
large firms make to bridge geographic divides:
[I]n the old days . . . everyone was [in the] conference room
sitting around eating sandwiches over lunch and talking in the
same room. Those days are bygones. [T]rying to capture that
same esprit de corps is . . . challenging when it’s being done
in . . . virtual meeting situations. . . . Bigger firms do try to
institutionalize [personal relationships across offices] but I
would say it’s not the same.189
Another lawyer explained that his firm spent large amounts on annual
retreats to build better relationships across the firm, but “obviously the people
who are down the hall from me . . . I know a whole lot better than the
people . . . in Silicon Valley or whatever. I just think proximity is very
important.”190
If attributes of the local office significantly define lawyers’ experiences,
this factor could cut either way in terms of professional satisfaction. On the
one hand, practicing in a collegial office with a positive culture can approximate
some of the more desirable attributes of a small firm, and being near decision
makers (whether formal management or influential rainmakers) can mitigate
the impersonal quality some interviewees ascribed to large firms. On the other
hand, geographic distance between offices can undermine some of the business
case for practicing in a large firm and can accentuate impersonal qualities of a
large firm. Consistent with this less favorable outcome, one interviewee
concluded:
[In the future,] I would never go to a firm where I wasn’t in the
main office. One of the things I don’t like is not being in the
main office where decisions are made and you’re not close to
people who might be handing out cases and work. You don’t
hear about stuff until too late.191
188. Interview with Lawyer 4, at 6.
189. Interview with Lawyer 18, at 14.
190. Interview with Lawyer 7, at 11–12. For discussion of the continuing importance of
proximity in the general economy, see Abraham J. B. Cable, Incubator Cities: Tomorrow’s Economy,
Yesterday’s Start-Ups, 2 MICH. J. PRIV. EQUITY & VENTURE CAP. L. 195, 212–17 (2013) (discussing
the geographic clustering of economic activity and describing the work of Richard Florida, Edward
Glaeser, and Michael Porter).
191. Interview with Lawyer 7, at 12.
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In short, just as large-firm lawyers vary in seniority and practice-area
specialization, they vary in local setting. And several interviewees suggested
that this local flavor is key to understanding their large-firm experiences.
4. Growing Pains
According to the tournament model, large firms tend to grow organically
as associates are promoted to partner.192 In other words, growth is expected and
arguably healthy.
But the interviews highlighted how a certain kind of rapid growth
incorporating large numbers of lawyers through a merger sometimes posed
integration problems that destabilized firms. For example, one interviewee
described how a firm that grew by thousands of lawyers through successive
mergers struggled to achieve even basic integration:
It was like, “Well, you guys are going to continue on your
parallel system until we figure out how to merge you into us.”
[O]ur phone systems weren’t brought together for, say, six
months. Which sounds like a short period of time now, but at
that time it was really weird not to be able to do an extension
dial to one of your partners that you were trying to work with,
and to not be in the same document management system and
things like that.193
Interviewees described other integration problems as well. Lawyers spent
time and energy on transitional committees.194 Without significant roots in the
new firm, rainmakers sometimes exited the new firms quickly.195 Local billing
rates did not always mesh well.196
More than one of the acquiring large firms ultimately failed. While these
failures might not have been a direct result of integration issues, they might
have added to these firms’ problems.197
In short, interviewees suggested that in some circumstances getting big (not
being big) drives professional anxiety.
192. See supra Section II.A (summarizing the tournament model).
193. Interview with Lawyer 18, at 10–11.
194. E.g., Interview with Lawyer 1, at 10.
195. E.g., Interview with Lawyer 18, at 8 (stating that rainmakers pushed for the merger and then
“left anyways”).
196. E.g., id. at 4–5 (discussing discrepancies in local billing rates).
197. For an example of how rapid growth can de-stabilize a firm, see generally Milton C. Regan,
Jr., Taxes and Death: The Rise and Demise of an American Law Firm, in 52 STUDIES IN LAW,
POLITICS, AND SOCIETY: LAW FIRMS, LEGAL CULTURE, AND LEGAL PRACTICE 107, 107–44 (2010)
(describing the failure of a “regional firm with national ambitions” that became involved in illegal tax
shelters as a growth strategy).
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IV. IMPLICATIONS & NEXT STEPS
This Section makes concrete suggestions for future confirmatory research.
Recognizing that such research will take time, it also makes suggestions for
how this Article’s preliminary observations can immediately improve career
advice to law students and lawyers.
A. Future Research
Despite some well-chronicled methodological objections to careersatisfaction surveys,198 legal scholars and bar groups are likely to keep
generating them. In order to test hypotheses of the type offered here and avoid
simplistic interpretations of results, researchers will need to collect new kinds
of information.
While the surveys discussed in Section II above have produced important
insights by collecting basic demographic information about race, gender, and
seniority, they have often been surprisingly inattentive to variations in practice
area and practice environment within the very broad category of “large firm.”
Accordingly, future surveys would benefit from:
1. Collecting information on respondent practice areas, such as general
litigation, transactional, bankruptcy, and intellectual property.
2. Collecting additional information on respondents’ local offices, such as
size compared to the overall firm and its geographic distance from firm
management.
3. Setting a more limited scope, such as surveying a particular practice area
or firm type, so the survey instrument can be more specifically tailored to
relevant information.
The bottom line is that researchers will gain little insight from additional
surveys reporting aggregate satisfaction (even if assiduously measured to the
second decimal point) for an impossibly broad segment of the legal profession.
But surveys that engage with the variables most likely to affect professional
satisfaction can confirm and improve understanding.
Research methods other than surveys can also help unpack the complicated
relationship between firm size and professional satisfaction. For example, case
studies of rapidly growing firms might assist in understanding the firm-wide
stresses that growth entails. In a similar vein, Milt Regan profitably used case-

198. See generally David. L. Chambers, Overstating the Satisfaction of Lawyers, 39 L. & SOC.
INQUIRY 313 (2014) (raising methodological objections to career satisfaction surveys, such as the
difficulty of interpreting results reported on Likert scales and nonresponse bias).
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study methods to illustrate how rapid expansion of a firm contributes to ethical
shortcomings among lawyers.199
Additional semi-structured interviews could also confirm and refine the
hypotheses offered in this Article.200 Such projects could be broader in scope—
interviewing a cultivated sample of large-firm lawyers across a range of
different practice areas and local office environments—to test whether the
experiences of lawyers involved in mergers are generalizable to the larger
population of big-firm lawyers.
Narrower qualitative studies might also provide fresh insight. Micro studies
of particular practice areas could further disentangle the relationship between
practice area economics and firm economics. As one interviewee stated:
I’m . . . a big believer that . . . almost every practice is a
different business from other practices. If [you are in] patent
prosecution, it’s going to look like one thing. If you’re a
startup lawyer, it’s going to look like another thing. If you’re
doing M&A for the Fortune 500 on the buy side, it’s going to
look like [another thing]—they’re all kind of different
businesses.201
In short, understanding the practice of law at the level lawyers actually
experience it is vital for developing a grounded theory of the large law firm.
B. Career Advice
Although this Article critiques the conventional wisdom, it is hard to blame
those, like Patrick Schiltz,202 who offered their honest opinions based on
imperfect evidence. Law students and lawyers must make career decisions in
real time, and they cannot wait for researchers to complete an elaborate research
agenda.
In that spirit, this Section identifies lines of inquiry for evaluating a large
firm. These are not bright line rules—the calculus for any career decision is
complex. But considering the following might at least provide helpful structure
for making a difficult and important decision.
1. Consider career stage. Section III.C.1 above emphasized the
importance of seniority. A large firm is not necessarily a bad place to start a
career. The experience may be a valuable credential for other opportunities,
and an introduction to an important professional network. But junior lawyers

199. See Regan, supra note 197 and accompanying text.
200. For examples of existing qualitative research of law firm organization, see NELSON, supra
note 20, Chambliss, supra note 91, Kirkland, supra note 92, and Smith supra note 97.
201. Interview with Lawyer 17, at 1.
202. For an overview of Schiltz’s work, see Section II.D above.
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should also know that unattractive attributes of large firms can be particularly
hard on them. Focus on performance metrics and remoteness from decisionmakers affect all lawyers, but these negative attributes of the large-firm
environment loom especially large for those facing a partnership determination
that can feel career defining. In addition, a large firm’s high degree of
specialization, use of leverage, and tendency towards large matters can pose
challenges for gaining well-rounded experience as a junior lawyer. New
lawyers should think critically about what they ultimately want from the firm,
because the path to equity partnership is difficult and the skills learned at a large
firm are not always easily transferable to other settings.
2. Look for practice-area compatibility. Section III.C.2 above emphasized
the importance of compatibility between practice area and firm. For established
lawyers, who have already made significant investments in particular areas of
expertise, such compatibility is paramount. Unfortunately, it is difficult to
generalize what makes for a good fit. But one can identify potential yellow
flags that might cause some concern: (a) a high concentration of service
partners or non-equity partners in the particular practice area at the specific firm
under consideration or more generally at large firms, (b) localized clientele for
whom national-firm rates (driven by the high overhead of maintaining a
national scope) represent a large increase over local competitors, and (c)
practice areas that are new to the firm or that previously defected from the firm.
3. Focus on the local office. Section III.C.3 discussed the importance of
proximity and the challenges of working across distant offices. While the
brand-name recognition and resources of a national firm might be advantages
in winning work, the attributes of the local office might be more important than
firm-wide characteristics when it comes to matters of internal firm
management. Accordingly, a lawyer considering a large firm should scrutinize
the local office—its capabilities, culture, and proximity to formal and informal
power centers—and understand that some touted advantages of a larger
“platform” may not fully materialize.
4. Consider how the firm is growing. Section III.C.4 above discussed the
stress that expansion through mergers can generate. Logically, one would
expect that large numbers of lateral hires (even absent a formal merger) would
have similar effects. When considering a firm, then, one might consider the
rate and manner of the firm’s growth compared to its competitors. If the firm
is expanding rapidly through mergers and lateral hires, that might justify asking
questions about how the firm is handling integration.
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V. CONCLUSION
The conventional wisdom—that increasing firm size adversely affects
lawyers—may be right in some cases. But in these interviews, at least two
counter-narratives emerged: indifference to large firms and satisfaction with
large firms compared to the alternatives. The presence of these counternarratives, together with the ambiguity of existing survey data, warrant new
hypothesizing about the relationship between firm size and lawyer satisfaction.
The evidence from these interviews suggests that seniority, practice-area
compatibility, attributes of the local office, and the manner of firm expansion
drive satisfaction at large firms.
For the legal profession, the stakes are high. The conventional wisdom
sometimes operationalizes existing research through blunt advice to graduating
law students. If that existing research crudely filters lawyers by firm size
measured by lawyer count, it may be prone to simplistic interpretations. While
it is hard to fault those who venture to give advice based on the best evidence
available, we should ultimately strive to understand not just whether firm size
and lawyer dissatisfaction are correlated, but also how they relate. From a more
nuanced understanding of that relationship, we might eventually be able to give
our students and graduates more useful advice about important career choices.

